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Abstract
We study fair resource allocation when the resources contain a mixture of divisible and
indivisible goods, focusing on the well-studied fairness notion of maximin share fairness (MMS).
With only indivisible goods, a full MMS allocation may not exist, but a constant multiplicative
approximate allocation always does. We analyze how the MMS approximation guarantee would
be affected when the resources to be allocated also contain divisible goods. In particular, we
show that the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee with mixed goods is no worse than
that with only indivisible goods. However, there exist problem instances to which adding some
divisible resources would strictly decrease the MMS approximation ratio of the instance. On
the algorithmic front, we propose a constructive algorithm that will always produce an α-MMS
allocation for any number of agents, where α takes values between 1/2 and 1 and is a monotone
increasing function determined by how agents value the divisible goods relative to their MMS
values.
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1 Introduction
Fair division concerns the problem of allocating a set of goods among interested agents in a way
that is fair to all participants involved. The goods involved could be heterogeneous and divisible,
usually modeled by a cake, in which case the problem is also known as cake-cutting ; in some other
cases, the goods are heterogeneous and indivisible, and the problem is known as indivisible resource
allocation.
Due to its subjective nature, a plethora of fairness notions have been proposed and investigated
in different resource allocation scenarios (see [Young, 1995] and [Brams and Taylor, 1996] for a
survey). In particular, as one of the most classic and widely known fairness notions, Steinhaus
[1948] proposed that in an allocation that involves n participating agents, each agent should receive
a bundle which is worth at least 1/n of her value for the entire set of goods. An allocation satisfying
such property is then known as a proportional allocation. Moreover, Steinhaus also showed that
a proportional allocation can always be found for any number of agents over any divisible goods.
However, this is not the case when goods are indivisible, with the simplest counterexample of two
agents dividing a single valuable good. In order to circumvent this issue, Budish [2011] presented a
natural alternative to the classic proportionality notion that also works for indivisible goods, known
as the maximin share (MMS) guarantee. In this definition, the maximin share (MMS) of an agent
is defined as the largest value she can get if she is allowed to partition goods into n bundles and
always receives the least desirable bundle. An allocation is said to be an MMS allocation if every
agent receives a bundle which is worth at least her maximin share.
The notion of MMS nicely captures the local measure of fairness even when the goods to be
allocated are indivisible. A natural question then arises of whether an MMS allocation always
exists in all problem instances. Surprisingly, Kurokawa et al. [2018] showed that even with additive
valuation functions, an MMS allocation may not always exist. However, a 2/3-MMS allocation can
always be found, in which each agent is guaranteed to receive a bundle worth at least 2/3 of their
MMS value. In other words, if we define the MMS approximation guarantee of a problem instance
as the largest α such that the instance admits an α-MMS allocation, the results in [Kurokawa et al.,
2018] imply that the worst MMS approximation guarantee across all indivisible problem instances
is strictly less than 1 and at least 2/3. Since then, many subsequent works have been carried
out on the improvements of MMS approximation guarantee, design of simpler algorithms, etc.
[Amanatidis et al., 2017; Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2018; Kurokawa et al.,
2018; Garg et al., 2018; Garg and Taki, 2019]. MMS has also been adopted as the fairness solution
concept in several practical applications [Budish, 2011; Goldman and Procaccia, 2015].
Even though MMS was mainly studied in the context of indivisible resource allocation, it is also
a well-defined fairness notion in a more general setting where both divisible and indivisible goods
are to be allocated. Many real-world scenarios, including but not limited to divorce or inheritance
settlements, involve allocating simultaneously divisible goods such as land or money and indivisible
goods such as houses or cars. What fairness notion should one adopt when dividing resources of
such mixed types? The fair allocation of mixed divisible and indivisible goods was first studied
by Bei et al. [2020], in which the authors proposed a new fairness notion called envy-freeness for
mixed goods (EFM) that generalizes envy-freeness, another well-studied fairness notion, to the
mixed goods setting. The maximin share guarantee, on the other hand, can be directly applied to
the mixed goods setting without any modifications. This allows us to compare the results of MMS
for mixed goods directly to those for indivisible goods.
In this paper, we aim to provide such a comparison. More specifically, we extend the analysis of
MMS allocations to the setting with mixed types of goods, and study its existence, approximation,
as well as computation. In particular, we hope to answer the following questions:
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1. Is the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee across all mixed goods instances the same
as that across all indivisible goods instances?
2. Given any problem instance with only indivisible goods, would adding some divisible resources
to it always (weakly) increase the MMS approximation ratio of this instance?
3. How to design algorithms that could find allocations with good MMS approximation guarantee
in mixed goods problem instances?
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we answer the three questions posed above.
In our first set of results, in Section 3, we show that any problem instance of mixed goods can
be converted into another problem instance with only indivisible goods, such that the two instances
have the same MMS value for every agent, and any allocation of the indivisible instance can be
converted to an allocation in the mixed instance. This reduction directly implies that the worst-
case MMS approximation guarantee across all mixed goods instances is the same as that across all
indivisible goods instances. In other words, in terms of worst-case MMS approximation guarantee,
having mixed types of goods will not make things worse compared to having only indivisible goods.
This is not a surprising result, because the non-existence of MMS allocations only arises when
the resources to be allocated become indivisible. It is therefore reasonable to think that adding
divisible goods to the set of indivisible goods can only help with the MMS approximation guarantee.
However, as we will show next, this intuition no longer holds at the per-instance level. In particular,
we show that there exists a problem instance with only indivisible goods, and when a small amount
of divisible goods is added to the instance, the MMS approximation guarantee of the instance
strictly decreases.
Next in Section 4, we focus on finding allocations with good MMS approximations with mixed
types of goods. More specifically, we show via a constructive algorithm that given any problem
instance with mixed goods, there exists an α-MMS allocation, where the parameter α, ranged
between 1/2 and 1, is a monotone increasing function of how agents value the divisible goods
relative to their MMS values. The idea of the algorithm is to repeatedly assign some agent a set
of indivisible goods along with a piece of cake to reach the agent’s α-MMS value, and then reduce
the problem to a smaller size. When the cake to be allocated is heterogeneous, the algorithm also
makes use of a generalized fairness notion of weighted proportionality to help allocate the cake.
On the computational front, we show PTAS algorithms for approximating the MMS value of an
agent and for computing an (1 − ǫ)α-MMS allocation in a mixed goods problem instance. These
algorithms run in time polynomial in n,m,L for any constant ǫ > 0, where n is the number of
agents, m is the number of indivisible goods, L is the bit length of an input.
Lastly, in Section 5, we discuss the relation between MMS and the recently introduced envy-
freeness for mixed goods (EFM) in the mixed goods setting. Generally speaking, neither the MMS
nor the EFM imply the other. We also provide a result showing what fraction of MMS can be
implied by an EFM allocation.
1.2 Related Work
As mentioned earlier, proportionality fairness was first introduced seven decades ago in the seminal
work [Steinhaus, 1948] in the context of cake-cutting. Since then, several efficient algorithms have
been proposed [Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Even and Paz, 1984], and a matching lower bound has
been found by Edmonds and Pruhs [2011].
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Despite the full-fledged theory of cake cutting [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Robertson and Webb,
1998; Barbanel, 2005], it was not until recently attracted significant attention on fair division of indi-
visible goods. Maximin share fairness, often regarded as a generalization of proportionality, was in-
troduced by Budish [2011]. Kurokawa et al. [2018] surprisingly showed that an MMS allocation may
not always exist, but a 2/3-MMS allocation always exists for any number of agents. The approxima-
tion guarantee for MMS was further improved to 3/4 by Ghodsi et al. [2018]. MMS allocations of
indivisible resources have also been extensively studied in several other settings, including for agents
with unequal entitlements [Farhadi et al., 2019] or in different groups [Suksompong, 2018], for goods
forming an undirected graph [Bouveret et al., 2017; Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018], for allocations
under matroid constraints [Gourve`s and Monnot, 2019] or in conjunction with economic efficiency
[Igarashi and Peters, 2019], as well as in the context of chore division, where chores refer to nega-
tively valued items [Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2017; Aziz et al., 2017, 2019a,b; Huang and Lu,
2019]. Caragiannis et al. [2019] introduced pairwise maximin share (PMMS), which is incompara-
ble with MMS. Barman et al. [2018] defined a stronger fairness notion than MMS, called groupwise
maximin share guarantee (GMMS).
Besides proportionality and MMS, another prominent fairness notion in resource allocation is
envy-freeness (EF) [Foley, 1967], which requires that each agent weakly prefers her own bundle to
any other agent’s bundle. It follows from definition that envy-freeness implies proportionality. An
envy-free allocation of divisible goods for any number of agents always exists [Alon, 1987] and can
be computed via a discrete and bounded algorithm [Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016]. With indivisible
goods, envy-freeness may not always be achievable. The notion is then often relaxed to envy-
freeness up to one good (EF1), which always exist for any number of agents and can be computed
efficiently [Lipton et al., 2004].
Recently, Bei et al. [2020] initiated the study of fair allocation of mixed divisible and indivis-
ible goods. They introduced the fairness notion of envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), which
unifies EF and EF1 to the mixed good setting. Bei et al. [2020] showed that an EFM allocation
with mixed goods always exists for any number of agents and investigated its computational as-
pects. Finally, a related line of research incorporates money into the fair division of indivisible
goods, with the objective of finding envy-free allocations [Alkan et al., 1991; Maskin, 1987; Klijn,
2000; Meertens et al., 2002]. In a recent work, Halpern and Shah [2019] studied the amount of
money needed for agents with additive valuations to achieve envy-freeness. Their results were fur-
ther improved by Brustle et al. [2019]. Moreover, Caragiannis and Ioannidis [2020] considered the
optimization problem of minimizing amount of subsidy to obtain envy-freeness for an allocation
instance.
2 Preliminaries
In this work, a resource allocation problem instance I = (N,M ∪ C) contains a set of agents N , a
set of indivisible goods M , and a set of ℓ heterogeneous divisible goods or cakes C .
Let M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the set of indivisible goods. Each agent i ∈ N has a non-negative
utility ui(g) for each indivisible good g ∈ M . We assume that each agent’s utility for a set of
indivisible goods is additive, that is, ui(M
′) =
∑
g∈M ′ ui(g) for any i ∈ N and M
′ ⊆M .
Let C = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dℓ} be the set of divisible goods, we assume without loss of generality
that each cake Di ∈ C is denoted by the interval [(i − 1)/ℓ, i/ℓ]. Thus the entire set of divisible
goods is represented by one cake C = [0, 1].1 A piece of cake is a finite union of subintervals of [0, 1].
1The agents’ density functions over the cakes are assumed to be non-atomic. This property allows us to view two
consecutive intervals as disjoint if their intersection is a singleton.
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Each agent i has a non-negative integrable density function fi. Given a piece of cake S ⊆ [0, 1],
agent i’s value over S is then defined as ui(S) =
∫
S
fi dx. Denote by f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) the vector
of density functions; f is called a density profile.
Denote by G = M ∪ C the set of mixed goods. Let M = (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn) be a partition of
indivisible goods M into n bundles such that agent i receives Mi. Let C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) be a
partition of the cake C such that agent i gets a piece of cake Ci. An allocation of mixed goods
G = M ∪ C is defined as A = (A1, A2, . . . , An), where Ai = Mi ∪ Ci is allocated to agent i. The
utility of agent i in an allocation A is then ui(Ai) = ui(Mi) + ui(Ci).
We now define the fairness notions considered in this paper. We focus on the maximin share
fairness, a generalization of the classical proportionality fairness.
Definition 2.1 (PROP). An allocation A is said to satisfy proportionality (PROP) if for each
agent i ∈ N , ui(Ai) ≥ ui(G)/n.
Definition 2.2. Let Πk(G) be the set of k-partitions of G. Define the k-maximin share of agent i
as
MMSi(k,G) = max
P=(P1,P2,...,Pk)∈Πk(G)
min
j∈[k]
ui(Pj).
Themaximin share value of agent i is MMSi(n,G). Every partition in argmaxP∈Πn(G)minj∈[n] ui(Pj)
is called an MMS partition for agent i.
For notational convenience, we will simply write MMSi when parameters n and G are clear
from the context.
Definition 2.3 (α-MMS). An allocation A of mixed goods G is said to satisfy the α-approximate
maximin share fairness (α-MMS), for some α ∈ [0, 1], if for every agent i ∈ N ,
ui(Ai) ≥ α ·MMSi(n,G).
We say a 1-MMS (or full-MMS) allocation satisfying the (full) maximin share fairness and write
MMS as a shorthand for 1-MMS. To slightly abuse the notation, we will also refer to an agent’s
maximin share value as MMS.
Precision and Input Representation. When discussing the computational aspects, it is nec-
essary to specify the precision and representation of the input problem instance. In this paper, we
assume that ui(g)’s for each i ∈ N, g ∈ M and ui(C) for each i ∈ N are all rational numbers, and
the whole input can be represented in no more than L bits.
We also adopt the Robertson-Webb (RW) query model to access agents’ density functions for
the cake. In the RW model, an algorithm is allowed to ask each agent the following two types of
queries:
Eval: An evaluation query returns ui([x, y]) of agent i over interval [x, y].
Cut: A cut query of β for agent i from point x returns a point y such that ui([x, y]) = β.
In this paper, we assume that each query in the RW model takes unit time.
3 MMS Approximation Guarantee
In this section, we examine how mixed goods affect the existence and approximation of MMS
allocations.
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3.1 Worst Case MMS Approximation Guarantee
An MMS allocation, while being an appealing solution concept, may not always exist in every
problem instance with indivisible goods Kurokawa et al. [2018]. Therefore one has to resort to
approximate MMS allocations. Allocating mixed types of goods is a generalization of the indivisible
good case, and therefore suffers from the same issue. We start by analyzing the worst-case MMS
approximation guarantee for mixed good problem instances.
Definition 3.1. Given a mixed good problem instance I, let γ(I) denote the largest α such that
the problem instance admits an α-MMS allocation. We also call γ(I) the MMS approximation
guarantee of problem instance I.
We further define two constants
γM = inf
I=(N,M∪C)
γ(I) and γI = inf
I=(N,M)
γ(I).
In other words, γM is the worst MMS approximation guarantee across all mixed goods problem
instances, and γI is the worst MMS approximation guarantee across all problem instances that
contain only indivisible goods. Previous works have showed that γI < 1 (Kurokawa et al. [2018])
and γI ≥
3
4 (Ghodsi et al. [2018]).
It is straightforward from definition to see that γM ≤ γI . In the following, our first result shows
that γM is also no less than γI . This is proved via the following reduction theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Given any problem instance with mixed goods I = (N,M ∪C), there exists another
problem instance I ′ = (N,M ′) with only indivisible items M ′ and the same set N of agents, such
that
• any allocation A′ of M ′ can be converted to another allocation A of M∪C, such that ui(Ai) =
ui(A
′
i) for each agent i ∈ N .
• MMSi(n,M ∪ C) = MMSi(n,M
′) for each agent i ∈ N .
Proof. We first transform the mixed goods instance I = (N,M ∪C) into an instance I ′ = (N,M ′)
with only indivisible goods. Consider an agent i and an MMS partition Pi for this agent in I. It
is safe to assume that Pi divides cake C into at most n intervals with at most n − 1 cuts. Then,
by collecting all cuts of all n MMS partitions P1, . . . ,Pn on C, they cut the cake into at most
n(n − 1) + 1 pieces. We can treat these pieces on C as a set M ′′ of indivisible “frozen pieces”.
Together with M , we now have M ′ =M ′′ ∪M .
Given any allocation A′ ofM ′, we can easily convert it into an allocation A of G by transforming
those ‘frozen cake pieces’ back to normal cake pieces. This also gives ui(Ai) = ui(A
′
i) for each agent
i ∈ N , which proves the first part of Theorem 3.2.
Lastly, it is clear that every agent can have the same MMS partition in I ′ as that in I, because
the cuts do not affect their MMS partitions. This implies that MMSi(n,M
′) ≥ MMSi(n,M ∪C) for
each agent i ∈ N . On the other hand, the first part of this theorem also implies MMSi(n,M ∪C) ≥
MMSi(n,M
′). Hence we have MMSi(n,M ∪ C) = MMSi(n,M
′) for each agent i ∈ N .
Theorem 3.2 directly implies the following result.
Corollary 3.3. γI = γM .
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In other words, having mixed types of goods does not affect the worst-case MMS approximation
guarantee across all problem instances.
As another corollary, this also means that if there exists a universal β-MMS algorithm for
indivisible goods for some β, it immediately implies that every problem instance of mixed goods
also admits a β-MMS allocation. We will discuss more on the algorithmic implication of this result
in Section 4.
3.2 Cake Does Not Always Help
Note that the equation in Corollary 3.3 is about the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee
across all problem instances. Perhaps surprisingly, we will next show that such equivalence may
not hold on a per-instance level. In particular, we will demonstrate via an example that sometimes,
adding some divisible resources to some problem instance I may hurt its MMS approximation
guarantee value γ(I).
Theorem 3.4. There exist some agent set N , indivisible goods M , and divisible goods C, such that
γ(N,M) > γ(N,M ∪ C).
In other words, adding some divisible goods to the set of resources may decrease the MMS approxi-
mation guarantee of this problem instance in some cases.
In the following we explain the intuition of the theorem proof. We want to find a problem
instance I = (N,M) such that γ(N,M) < 1, and the instance should have the following properties.
Fix an agent i. In her MMS allocation, the least valued bundle is unique, i.e., the value of the
least valued bundle is strictly less than that of the second least valued bundle.
If this is the case, then given a cake C with a small enough value ǫ, the new MMS value
MMSi(n,M ∪ C) should be exactly MMSi(n,M) + ǫ.
Now suppose that in the instance I, all the agents have this property. This means that every
agent’s MMS value will be increased by ǫ when we add a cake C of a small enough value ǫ to the
instance I. The second required property of I is that in any γ(N,M)-MMS allocation, there are
at least two agents that receive γ(N,M) times their MMS values.
With these two properties, the actual cake C will not be enough for distributing to all the
agents while clinging to a large enough MMS approximation ratio γ(N,M). In other words, with
the cake C added, the new MMS ratio γ(N,M ∪ C) will be decreased, comparing to γ(N,M).
Finally, the counterexample used to show the non-existence of MMS allocation in [Kurokawa et al.,
2018] can be utilized to construct the instance I that satisfies all above mentioned properties. The
details are omitted here. The full proof can be found in the Appendix.
4 Algorithms for Computing Approximate MMS Allocations
The previous section investigates MMS approximation guarantee, which is the best possible MMS
approximation of a problem instance. In this section, our goal is to design algorithms that could
compute allocations with good MMS approximation ratios in a mixed goods problem instance. We
hope such algorithm can be flexible, in the sense that when the problem instance contains only
indivisible goods, the MMS approximation of the output allocation should match or be close to
the best approximation ratio for indivisible goods previously known; on the other hand, when the
resources contain enough of the divisible goods, the indivisible goods would become negligible, and
our algorithm should be able to produce an allocation that gives each agent their full MMS value.
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As the main result of this section, in the following we present such an algorithm. We will show
that the algorithm will always produce an α-MMS allocation in the mixed goods setting for any
number of agents, where α is a monotone increasing function of how agents value the divisible
goods relative to their MMS values and ranges between 1/2 and 1.
Theorem 4.1. Given any mixed good problem instance (N,M ∪C), an α-MMS allocation always
exists, where
α = min
{
1,
1
2
+ min
i∈N
{
ui(C)
2(n− 1) ·MMSi
}}
.
Furthermore, for any constant ǫ > 0, we can compute a ratio α′ and an allocation A in time
polynomial in n,m,L such that:
1. α′ ≥ α, and
2. the allocation A is (1− ǫ)α′-MMS.
Here n is the number of agents, m is the number of items, and L is the total bit length of all input
parameters.
The remaining of this section is dedicated to the proof of this theorem. The proof consists of
the following steps.
Section 4.1: We first focus on a restricted case in which the cake to be allocated is homogeneous
to every agent. We show via a constructive, but not necessarily polynomial time algorithm
that an α-MMS allocation always exists in such setting.
Section 4.2: Next we generalize the above algorithm to the general case with heterogeneous cake,
using the concept of weighted proportionality in cake-cutting.
Section 4.3: We discuss how to convert the algorithm to a polynomial time algorithm at the cost
of a small loss in the MMS approximation ratio.
We also discuss the implication of this theorem, and how to further improve the approximation
ratio α in Section 4.4.
4.1 Homogeneous Cake
We begin with a special case where the cake to be allocated is homogeneous, meaning that each
agent values all pieces of equal size the same. In other words, the value of a piece of cake to each
agent depends only on the length of the piece2. We refer the homogeneous cake as Cˆ.
4.1.1 The Algorithm
The complete algorithm to compute an α-MMS allocation is shown in Algorithm 1. Our algorithm
is in spirit similar to the algorithm in Ghodsi et al. [2018]. After initialization, the algorithm can
be decomposed into two phases as follows:
• Phase 1: allocate big goods (lines 4-7). Algorithm 1 repeatedly allocates some agent a single
indivisible good which has value at least α times this agent’s MMS value. Then, both the
agent and the allocated good are removed from all further considerations.
2An even more restricted case is when the cake is valued the same to all agents. The canonical example of the
divisible goods of this special case is money.
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ALGORITHM 1: Mixed-MMS-Homogeneous(N,M ∪ Cˆ)
Input: Agents N , indivisible goods M and homogeneous cake Cˆ, utility and density
functions.
1 Compute MMSi,∀i ∈ N .
2 α← min
{
1, 12 +mini∈N
{
ui(C)
2(n−1)·MMSi
}}
3 A1, A2, . . . , An ← ∅
// Phase 1: allocate big goods.
4 while ∃i ∈ N, g ∈M such that ui(g) ≥ α ·MMSi do
5 Ai ← {g} // arbitrary tie-breaking
6 N ← N \ {i},M ←M \ {g}
7 end
// Phase 2: allocate small goods.
8 while |N | ≥ 2 do
9 B ← ∅
10 Add one indivisible good at a time to B until uj(B) ≥ (1− α) ·MMSj for some agent j
or B =M .
11 Suppose Cˆ = [a, b]. For all i ∈ N , let xi be the leftmost point with
ui(B ∪ [a, xi]) ≥ α ·MMSi.
12 i∗ ← argmini∈N xi // arbitrary tie-breaking
13 Ai∗ ← B ∪ [a, xi∗ ]
14 N ← N \ {i∗},M ←M \B, Cˆ ← Cˆ \ [a, xi∗ ]
15 end
16 Give all remaining goods to the last agent.
17 return (A1, A2, . . . , An)
• Phase 2: allocate small goods (lines 8-15). This phase executes in rounds. In each round,
Algorithm 1 chooses an agent i∗ and allocates some indivisible goods B (formed at line 10)
along with a piece of cake [a, xi∗ ] to agent i
∗ (line 13). Then again, both the agent and her
goods are removed from the instance.
4.1.2 The Analysis
Algorithm 1 consists of two phases. We analyze each of them separately.
Phase 1: Allocate big goods
First, when goods are all indivisible, Amanatidis et al. [2017] showed that allocating a single
good to an agent does not decrease the MMS values of other agents. Here we show that this result
holds in the mixed goods setting as well.
Lemma 4.2 (Monotonicity property). Given an instance (N,G = M ∪ C), for any agent i ∈ N
and any indivisible good g ∈M , it holds that
MMSi(n− 1, G \ {g}) ≥ MMSi(n,G).
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Proof. Removing a single indivisible good in an MMS partition of agent i affects exactly one
bundle and each of the remaining n− 1 bundles has value at least MMSi(n,G). Therefore, we have
MMSi(n− 1, G \ {g}) ≥ MMSi(n,G).
Denote by N1 the set of remaining agents and G1 the set of unallocated goods just before Phase
2 is executed. Let n1 = |N1|. Applying Lemma 4.2 n − n1 times, we have that for each agent
i ∈ N1, MMSi(n1, G1) ≥ MMSi(n,G). In addition, each agent i who leaves the system in the phase
receives an item of value at least α ·MMS. This implies that Phase 1 will not affect the correctness
and termination of Algorithm 1. It simply adds the property that in Phase 2, each remaining agent
i will value each of the remaining goods less than α ·MMSi.
Phase 2: Allocate small goods
In this phase, at each round, for the agent i∗ selected at line 12, we show that it satisfies two
properties:
(1) ui∗(Ai∗) ≥ α ·MMSi∗ ;
(2) For each agent j remains in N , uj(Ai∗) ≤ MMSj.
(1) is straightforward by the way each xi is computed at line 11. To show (2) is true, we remark
that because no single good is valued more that α ·MMSi for any agent i. Therefore the set B
selected at line 10 must satisfy uj(B) ≤ MMSj for all j ∈ N . After line 11 it continues to satisfy
that uj(B ∪ [a, xj ]) ≤ MMSj for each j ∈ N . Then because i
∗ is selected to be the smallest value,
one would have uj(Ai∗ = {B ∪ [a, xi∗ ]}) ≤ uj(B ∪ [a, xj ]) ≤ MMSj for each agent j ∈ N .
In particular, property (2) ensures that the last agent at line 16 is still left with enough goods
to reach her MMS value. Therefore every agent i will receive value at least α ·MMSi after the two
phases. It only remains to show that the cake Cˆ is enough to be allocated throughout the process.
Lemma 4.3. Cake Cˆ is enough to be allocated in Algorithm 1.
In other words, xi for each agent i ∈ N at line 11 is always well defined in each round.
Proof. Line 2 in Algorithm 1 indicates that for each agent i ∈ N , ui(Cˆ) ≥ (n− 1) · (2α− 1) ·MMSi.
As a result, each agent i has value at least (2α− 1) ·MMSi for a
1
n−1 fraction of the entire cake Cˆ.
It is also clear that Phase 2 has been executed at most n− 1 times during the algorithm run. That
is to say there are at most n− 1 times if cutting a piece of Cˆ and allocating this piece to an agent.
Based on whether there exists some agent who has value at least 1−α times her MMS for goods
in B (line 10), we distinguish two cases.
• Line 10: there exists some agent j with uj(B) ≥ (1−α) ·MMSj . As mentioned earlier, a
1
n−1
fraction of Cˆ is worth at least (2α − 1) ·MMSj . Thus it together with B is enough to give
agent j a value of at least α ·MMSj . This means at line 11, the length of [a, xj ] is no more
than 1
n−1 . Moreover, Algorithm 1 chooses the agent who claims the smallest piece of cake as
agent i∗ at line 12, which means the length of [a, xi∗ ] is again no more than
1
n−1 . Combining
the fact that Phase 2 executes at most n− 1 times, if this case holds every time, the cake will
be enough.
• Line 10: uj(B) < (1− α) ·MMSj for each agent j. In this case, B is set to be M at line 10.
Note that after the first time of such case, M will become empty, and the agents left will
divide only the cake for the remaining rounds. Let k be the number of the remaining agents
whenM becomes empty. By property (2) that we showed above, we know the remaining cake
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ALGORITHM 2: The Mixed MMS Algorithm
Input: Agents N , indivisible goods M and heterogeneous cake C, utility and density
functions.
1 Let Cˆ = [0, 1] be a homogeneous cake with ui(Cˆ) = ui(C) for each agent i ∈ N .
2 (M1 ∪ Cˆ1,M2 ∪ Cˆ2, . . . ,Mn ∪ Cˆn)←Mixed-MMS-Homogeneous(N,M ∪ Cˆ)
3 For each i ∈ N , let wi ← ui(Cˆi)/ui(C) if ui(C) > 0; wi ← 0 otherwise.
4 (C1, C2, . . . , Cn)←WPRAlloc(N,C,w = (w1, . . . , wn)) // allocate cake C
5 return (M1 ∪ C1,M2 ∪ C2, . . . ,Mn ∪Cn)
is valued at least k ·MMSi for each remaining agent i. Thus it is enough for each agent i to
receive a piece with value at least α ·MMSi.
Combine everything together, we conclude that Algorithm 1 is a correct algorithm that always
outputs an α-MMS allocation.
4.2 Heterogeneous Cake
We now show how to extend algorithm 1 to the general setting with a heterogeneous cake C. The
new algorithm follows a very simple idea as follows. First we replace cake C with a homogeneous
cake Cˆ such that ui(Cˆ) = ui(C) for each agent i, and allocate resources M and Cˆ to all agents
using Algorithm 1. Let Cˆi be the cake allocated to agent i. Note that since Cˆ is homogeneous, only
the length of Cˆi matters, which we denote as wi. Because Cˆ has total length 1, wi also represents
the fraction of the cake Cˆ allocated to agent i. Next, we view wi as the entitlement (or weight) of
agent i to the real cake C, and obtain the actual allocation of cake C via a procedure known as the
weighted proportional allocation.
Weighted proportional cake-cutting This concept generalizes the proportional cake-cutting
to the weighted case. Formally, assume that every agent i ∈ N is assigned a non-negative weight
wi, such that
∑
i∈N wi = 1. We call the vector of weights w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) a weight profile.
Definition 4.4 (WPR). Given a weight profile w, an allocation C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) of cake C is
said to satisfy weighted proportionality (WPR) if for every agent i ∈ N , ui(Ci) ≥ wi · ui(C).
A weighted proportional allocation of cake gives each agent at least her entitled fraction of the
entire cake from her own perspective. The proportionality fairness (Definition 2.1) is a special case
of WPR with weight profile w = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n). With any set of agents and any weighted
profile, a weighted proportional allocation always exists [Cseh and Fleiner, 2018]. In the following,
we will assume that our algorithm is equipped with a protocol WPRAlloc(N,C,w) that could
return us a weighted proportional allocation of cake C, among the set of agent N with weight
profile w.
The complete algorithm to compute an α-MMS allocation of mixed goods for any number of
agents is shown in Algorithm 2. To show that this algorithm can find an α-MMS allocation with
mixed goods that contain a heterogeneous cake, it suffices to prove the following two simple facts.
1. MMSi(n,M ∪ C) = MMSi(n,M ∪ Cˆ). This is obvious because both C and C
′ are divisible
with ui(C) = ui(Cˆ). Only changing the density of a cake will not affect the MMS value of
any agent.
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2. ui(Ci) ≥ ui(Cˆi). This is because by weighted proportionality, we have
ui(Ci) ≥ wi · ui(C) = wi · ui(Cˆ) = ui(Cˆi).
4.3 Computation
We investigate the computational issues in finding an α-MMS allocation in this part. Note that
Algorithm 2 is not a polynomial time algorithm unless P=NP. This is because it requires the
knowledge of every agent’s MMS value, which is NP-hard to compute even with only indivisible
resources [Kurokawa et al., 2018].
To obtain a polynomial time approximation algorithm, we first show how to approximate the
MMS value of an agent with mixed goods, then focus on obtaining an approximate α-MMS alloca-
tion.
Approximate MMS value with mixed goods When goods are indivisible, Woeginger [1997]
showed a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) to approximately compute the MMS
value of an agent. More specifically, given any constant ǫ > 0 and any agent, we can partition the
indivisible goods into n bundles in polynomial time, such that each bundle is worth at least 1− ǫ
of that agent’s MMS value.
By utilizing this PTAS algorithm fromWoeginger [1997], here we present a new PTAS algorithm
to approximate MMS values for mixed goods.
Lemma 4.5. Given any mixed goods instance I = (N,M ∪ C) and constant ǫ > 0, for any
agent i ∈ N , one can compute a partition (P1, . . . , Pn) of M ∪ C in polynomial time, such that
minj∈N ui(Pj) ≥ (1− ǫ) ·MMSi.
Proof. Let agent i cut the cake C into ⌈2n
ǫ
⌉ disjoint intervals worth at most ǫ·ui(C)2n each to this
agent. Denote by C˜ the collection of these discretized, indivisible intervals. The new discretized
instance is then denoted by I ′ = (N,M ∪ C˜). This is a problem instance with only indivsible goods.
We first claim that
MMSi ≥MMSi(n,M ∪ C˜) ≥
(
1−
ǫ
2
)
·MMSi.
The first inequality holds trivially by definition. We proceed to show the second. Consider an MMS
partition T of I for agent i. We construct a partition T ′ of I ′ as follows. First let the partition of its
original indivisible goods M be exactly the same as that in T . We then distribute the intervals in
C˜ into these n bundles. For any bundle whose value is less than
(
1− ǫ2
)
·MMSi to agent i, add one
interval at a time to this bundle until agent i’s value for this bundle falls in
[(
1− ǫ2
)
MMSi,MMSi
]
.
This is possible because MMSi ≥ ui(C)/n and each interval is worth at most
ǫ·ui(C)
2n ≤
ǫ
2 ·MMSi.
Also C˜ will have enough pieces for these allocations because in T , each bundle is worth at least
MMSi to agent i. Repeat this procedure for all bundles. Finally distribute any remaining intervals
to any of these bundles arbitrarily. Let the resulting partition be T ′.
By the end of these procedures, each bundle in T ′ is worth at least (1 − ǫ2) ·MMSi. Then by
the definition of MMS, the second inequality holds. We remark that these steps are not actually
implemented in our algorithm. They are only used to demonstrate the difference of MMS values
for the two instances.
Now, because I ′ is a problem instance with only indivisible goods, we can compute a parti-
tion (P1, . . . , Pn) such that minj∈N ui(Pj) ≥ (1 −
ǫ
2) ·MMSi(n,M ∪ C˜) via the PTAS algorithm
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from [Woeginger, 1997]. It then holds that
min
j∈N
ui(Pj) ≥
(
1−
ǫ
2
)(
1−
ǫ
2
)
·MMSi(n,M ∪ C) ≥ (1− ǫ)MMSi(n,M ∪ C).
Lemma 4.5 also implies that we can compute in polynomial time a value MMS′i, such that
MMSi ≥ MMS
′
i ≥ (1− ǫ)MMSi.
Approximate α-MMS allocation Now we turn to the polynomial time algorithm for computing
an approximate α-MMS allocation.
The algorithm is almost identical to Algorithm 2 except for
1. at line 1 of Algorithm 1, we compute the approximate values MMS′i, which is at most MMSi
and at least (1− ǫ) ·MMSi for each agent i ∈ N ;
2. at line 2 of Algorithm 1, we compute the ratio α′ using the approximate values MMS′.
A similar analysis to Lemma 4.3 shows that the new algorithm with these approximate values will
still terminate.
According to Lemma 4.5, we know MMSi ≥ MMS
′
i for each i ∈ N , which implies that α
′ ≥ α.
Next, for any agent i, by the design of the algorithm, she is guaranteed a bundle with value at least
α′ ·MMS′i ≥ (1− ǫ)α
′ ·MMSi. Therefore the resulting allocation is (1− ǫ)α
′-MMS.
Time complexity analysis In light of Lemma 4.5, computing approximate MMS values takes
polynomial time. Then the only step that needs time complexity analysis is the weighted propor-
tional allocation protocol WPRAlloc(N,C,w) at line 4 of Algorithm 2. When all weights are
rational numbers, Cseh and Fleiner [2018] gave an implementation of the protocol using O(n logD)
queries, where D is the common denominator of weights. They also showed that their implemen-
tation is asymptotically the fastest possible.
We have assumed that our input has size at most L bits. Then each of the arithmetic operations
in steps before line 4 (Algorithm 2) keep the numbers rational with polynomial bit size. Thus, by
applying the protocol from Cseh and Fleiner [2018], WPRAlloc at line 4 of Algorithm 2 can be
implemented in polynomial time. Summarize everything together, we obtain a polynomial time
algorithm.
Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 together complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.4 Discussions and Improvements of Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1 has several implications. For example, a direct corollary from it shows the amount of
divisible good needed to ensure that the instance admits a full-MMS allocation.
Corollary 4.6. Given a mixed good problem instance I = (N,M ∪ C), if ui(C) ≥ (n − 1)MMSi
holds for each agent i ∈ N , then an MMS allocation is guaranteed to exist.
This means even with the presence of indivisible items, as long as there are enough divisible
goods, a full-MMS allocation can always be found. However, this corollary should not be inter-
preted as that this is the least amount of divisible goods required. For example, Halpern and Shah
[2019] studies the allocation of indivisible goods and a very special type of divisible goods, money.
They investigated the least amount of money needed for a problem instance to have an envy-free
allocation. An envy-free allocation is also a full-MMS allocation. However, their result and this
corollary are incomparable.
13
Boosting the approximation ratio In Theorem 4.1, the smallest value for α is 1/2, achieved
when the resources contain only indivisible goods. In this case, the theorem ensures that a 1/2-
MMS allocation always exists. However, there is a gap between this 1/2 guarantee from our result
and that of the best known result with only indivisible goods, which is 3/4 due to Ghodsi et al.
[2018] and Garg and Taki [2019]. In the following, we show that a simple procedure can boost the
MMS approximation ratio computed by our algorithm to (almost) match the currently best known
ratio for indivisible goods.
First, combining Theorem 4.1 with Corollary 3.3 (γI = γM ), we can first improve the value α
directly to max{α, γI} in Theorem 4.1. Next, computational-wise, suppose there exists an algorithm
that guarantees to output a β-MMS allocation with indivisible goods for some β. Then given a
mixed good problem instance, we first compute α′ via Theorem 4.1 and compare it with β: if
α′ ≥ β, we directly apply Theorem 4.1; otherwise, we cut the cake into small intervals, each valued
at most ǫ for each agent, and use the β-MMS algorithm to obtain the allocation of this instance
with only indivisible goods. In summary, we have the following strengthened result:
Theorem 4.7. A max{α, γI}-MMS allocation always exists for any number of agents.
In addition, if there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can always output a β-MMS alloca-
tion with indivisible goods, then for any constant ǫ > 0, there is another polynomial time algorithm
that computes a (1− ǫ)max{α, β}-MMS allocation with mixed goods.
The currently best known β is 34 by Ghodsi et al. [2018] and Garg and Taki [2019]. Any better
β found in the future would immediately imply a better MMS approximation guarantee in the
mixed goods setting as well.
5 Relation of MMS and Envy-Freeness for Mixed Goods
Proportionality fairness, and its generalization, MMS, are often compared to another well studied
fairness notion of envy-freeness (EF). It is known that with only divisible goods, envy-freeness
implies proportionality but not vice versa. With only indivisible goods, the relaxed notion of EF,
known as envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), and the relaxed notion of proportionality, MMS, do
not imply each other [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. In a recent work, Bei et al. [2020] proposed a new
envy-freeness notion, termed envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), that generalizes both EF and
EF1 to the setting of mixed goods. In this section, we first investigate the relation between MMS
and EFM in mixed goods setting.
We include the definition of EF, EF1, and EFM here for the sake of being self-contained.
Definition 5.1 (EF). An allocation A is said to satisfy envy-freeness (EF) if for any pair of agents
i, j ∈ N , ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj).
Definition 5.2 (EF1). With indivisible goods, an allocation A is said to satisfy envy-freeness up
to one good (EF1) if
∀i, j ∈ N,∃g ∈ Aj , such that ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj \ {g}).
Definition 5.3 (EFM [Bei et al., 2020]). An allocation A is said to satisfy envy-freeness for mixed
goods (EFM) in the sense that for any i, j ∈ N ,
• if j’s bundle consists of only indivisible goods, there exists g ∈ Aj such that ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj \
{g});
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• otherwise, ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj).
We first investigate the relation between EFM and (full) MMS. In particular, we show that:
Lemma 5.4. Neither the MMS nor the EFM implies the other.
Proof. First note that an MMS allocation does not always exist with mixed goods, but EFM does
[Bei et al., 2020]. This immediately shows that EFM does not imply MMS.
On the other hand, we show via the following example that MMS also does not imply EFM.
Example. Consider an instance with 2 agents N = {1, 2}, the set of indivisible goodsM = {a, b},
and a homogeneous cake C. We list below the utilities of each agent for the goods:
Agent 1: u1(a) = 2, u1(b) = 1, u1(C) = 0.5.
Agent 2: u2(a) = 1.5, u2(b) = 2, u2(C) = 0.
One can check that the allocation ({b, C}, {a}) satisfies MMS. However, this allocation is not EFM
because agent 2 envies agent 1, whose bundle contains divisible good.
Next, we consider the relation between EFM and the approximation of MMS, focusing on what
approximation of MMS can be achieved by an EFM allocation.
On one hand, when goods are all divisible, EFM (reduced to EF) is always 1-MMS (reduces
to proportionality). On the other hand, when goods are all indivisible, Amanatidis et al. [2018]
showed that any EFM (reduces to EF1) allocation is always 1/n-MMS and this approximation
ratio is tight. Then, with mixed goods, one might ask if an EFM allocation would have the MMS
approximation ratio laying between 1 and 1/n. Our next lemma confirm this conjecture.
Lemma 5.5. Given any mixed goods instance (N,M∪C), for any EFM allocation (A1, A2, . . . , An)
and any agent i ∈ N , we have
vi(Ai) ≥
MMSi(n,M) + vi(C)
n
≥
MMSi(n,M ∪C)
n
.
The proof is a direct generalization of the proof of Proposition 3.6 in Amanatidis et al. [2018].
From Lemma 5.5, we know that EFM implies α-MMS where α is a monotone increasing function
that depends on the agent’s value on the whole cake. In other words, one can directly utilize the
EFM allocation to obtain an α-MMS allocation with α varied from 1/n (goods are indivisible only)
to 1 (goods are divisible only). On the other hand, our result in Section 4 shows that we can always
have an α-MMS allocation with α ranging from 1/2 to 1.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we study the extent to which we can find approximate MMS allocations when the
resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. We analyze the relation of the worst-case
MMS approximation guarantees between mixed goods instances and indivisible goods instances.
We also present an algorithm to produce an α-MMS allocation for any number of agents, where
α monotonically increases in terms of the ratio between agents’ values for the divisible goods and
their MMS values. For future work, it would be interesting to improve the MMS approximation
guarantee with mixed goods. Another working direction is to study fair allocations in the mixed
goods setting in conjunction with economic efficiency notions such as Pareto optimality.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Our counterexample will utilize the following lemma from [Kurokawa et al., 2018], which is also
used for showing the nonexistence of full MMS allocation with indivisible goods.
Lemma A.1 (Base of counterexample [Kurokawa et al., 2018]). For any n ≥ 6, there exists an
n× n matrix M , satisfying the following properties:
1. All entries are non-negative (i.e., ∀i, j : Mi,j ≥ 0).
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2. All entries of the last row and column, and the first entry in the first row, are positive (i.e.,
∀i : Mi,n,Mn,i > 0 and M1,1 > 0).
3. All rows and columns sum to 1 (i.e., M~1 =M⊤~1 = ~1).
4. Define M+ as the set of all positive entries in M . Then if we wish to partition M+ into n
subsets that sum to exactly 1, then our partition must correspond to either the rows of M or
the columns of M .
Then construct two n × n matrices P+ and P−. Let P+1,1 = P
−
1,1 = −ǫ, P
+
n,1 = P
−
1,n = −ǫ,
P+n,n = P
−
n,n = (2n − 3)ǫ, and P
+
n,i = P
−
i,n = −2ǫ for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Take n = 6 as an example, we
show below the construction of matrices P+ and P−:
P+ =


−ǫ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
−ǫ −2ǫ −2ǫ −2ǫ −2ǫ 9ǫ


P− =


−ǫ 0 0 0 0 −ǫ
0 0 0 0 0 −2ǫ
0 0 0 0 0 −2ǫ
0 0 0 0 0 −2ǫ
0 0 0 0 0 −2ǫ
0 0 0 0 0 9ǫ


Consider a matrix M satisfying all properties listed in Lemma A.1. By setting a properly small
value ǫ, we can always make sure that every entry of M + P+ and M + P− is non-negative. In
the following, we will treat each entry as an indivisible good. We next divide N into two disjoint
subsets. One contains ⌊n2 ⌋ agents, denoted by N
+. The other contains the rest agents, denoted by
N−. We let each agent i ∈ N+ take the values of n2 items as in matrix M + P+, and each agent
i ∈ N− take the values of n2 items as in matrix M + P−. We call this problem instance I. One
can check that in this instance I, the MMS value for each agent i is 1− ǫ.
According to the fourth property in Lemma A.1, there are only two ways to distribute these
items into n bundles such that each bundle has value close to 1: either the rows ofM or the columns
of M . In each of these two partitions, we can always find at least 2 agents who value their bundles
exactly 1−2ǫ. For example, there are two such agents from N+ if the partition is n columns, or two
from N− if the partition is n rows. In particular, this means the MMS approximation guarantee
γ(I) of this instance I is 1−2ǫ1−ǫ .
Suppose now we add a homogeneous cake to this problem instance I. This cake has value ǫ for
each agent. Every agent’s MMS value will now increase from 1− ǫ to 1. However, in any allocation,
there will still be at least two agents whose values for the indivisible goods are no more than 1−2ǫ.
Then the best possible way to distribute the cake is to allocate it only to those agents, which means
at least one such agent will receive a bundle of value at most 1−2ǫ+ ǫ2 = 1−
3ǫ
2 . Thus, in this case,
the MMS approximation ratio of such agent will be no more than 1− 3ǫ2 , which is strictly smaller
than 1−2ǫ1−ǫ when ǫ < 1/4.
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